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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1957
CONTRACTS
Insurance Contracts-Breach by Anticipatory Repudiation. In
Trompeter v. United Insurance Company' the Washington supreme
court considered, for the first time, the controversial problem of
breach by anticipatory repudiation in insurance contracts. The plaintiff
purchased from the defendant insurance company an accident insur-
ance policy which provided: "If such injury . . . shall wholly and
continuously disable the Insured for one day or more, the Company
will pay indemnity at the rate of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars per
month, beginning with the first medical treatment during disability,
so long as the Insured lives and suffers total loss of time. . . ." Fol-
lowing a serious injury, the plaintiff filed a claim with the company
for disability benefits. Initially, the company denied the validity of the
claim on the ground that the injury was only temporary. But later
the defendant offered to pay the plaintiff if he would execute a
release, which he did. Subsequently, the plaintiff made further claims
for benefits to compensate for the same injury, but these claims the
defendant refused to honor, alleging total discharge by the release.
The plaintiff then sued to recover the accumulated monthly indem-
nity of one hundred dollars per month plus all future installments.
He contended that, because the defendant refused to pay the recurring
installments of monthly indemnity, it had completely repudiated its
contract, and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to the value of all
future installments on the theory of breach of contract by anticipatory
repudiation.
The trial court found as follows: (1) the plaintiff was totally and
permanently disabled; (2) there was no consideration for the alleged
release; (3) the defendant had repudiated its contract. The court
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the present value of all
future installments, as well as the installments presently due. The
defendant appealed, contending that the recovery should have been
limited to the accumulated monthly installments.
The Washington supreme court reversed the trial court, holding
that while the refusal to pay the amount due was a breach, it was not
such a repudiation as to entitle the plaintiff to recover, in a lump
sum, all future installments under the policy. The court reasoned that
the insurance company, instead of repudiating its obligations under
'151 Wash. Dec. 115, 316 P.2d 455 (1957).
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the policy, had recognized that the policy was still in force, but de-
fended on the ground that it had paid all amounts due and had been
discharged of further liability by the plaintiff's release.
An anticipatory breach of contract arises upon an absolute and
unequivocal repudiation2 of a contract by one party before he is under
a present duty to perform.' While most jurisdictions have accepted the
doctrine of breach by anticipatory repudiation in bilateral contracts,4
it is generally held to be inapplicable to contracts where there exists
an executory obligation on the part of one party only.5
The reason for this distinction is supposed to find its justification
in the often-quoted case of Hochester v. De la Tour.6 In that case
it was said that the reason for allowing an action for breach by
anticipatory repudiation was that otherwise the obligee would have
to go through the useless process of keeping himself ready and willing
to perform until the time for the obligor's performance arrived. On
the basis of this reasoning, if the injured party never had any per-
formance to render, or, having such a performance, had already
performed it, it would not be necessary for his protection to give
him an immediate action for damages for the anticipatory breach.7
Corbin suggests that the real reasons for allowing an immediate
action for an anticipatory repudiation are that the repudiation often
causes immediate loss in property values and disturbs the serenity of
the promisee, and that to allow the action makes for an early settle-
ment of the dispute and a timely payment of damages.8 These reasons
would seem to apply to contracts where there exists an executory
2 McClosky & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101 (3rd Cir. 1955) ; Kentucky
v. Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 196 Tenn. 641, 270 S.W.2d 188 (1954) ; Gilmore
v. American Gas Machine Co., - Ohio - , 129 N.E2d 93 (1952) ; Humphrey v.
Placid Oil Co., 244 F2d 184 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Campos v. Olson, 241 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
1957) ; Salot v. Wershow, - Cal. - , 320 P.2d 926 (1958).
8 4 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 959 (1951).
4 Ibid., McFerran v. Heroux, 44 Wn.2d 631, 269 P.2d 815 (1954). The court in that
case said: "Where a party to a contract repudiates the contract, either by a positive re-
fusal to perform before performance is due or by putting it out of his power to perform,
an action for damages brought immediately is not premature." Accord, Casey v. Murphy,
143 Wash. 17, 253 P. 1078 (1927), and Hunter v. Wenatchee Land Co., 50 Wash. 438,
97 P. 494 (1908). See also, Mignon v. Tuller Fabric Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d. 605 (1956) ;
Placid Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 244 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1957) ; City of Reyston v. Littrell
Engineering Co., 87 Ga. App. 903, 75 S.E.2d 678 (1953).
5 4 CoRaIN, CoNTRACTs § 959 (1951) ; But see Pollock v. Pollock, - Texas -,
46 S.W.2d 292 (1932), where the Texas court states that the doctrine of breach by
anticipatory repudiation is not restricted to those cases where the contract is still
executory on both sides.62 El. & Bl. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (1853).
74 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 962 (1951) ; Note, Anticipatory Breach of Contract-Effects
of Repudiation, 8 MIAMI L. Q. 68 (1953).
8 4 CORIN, CoNTRAcTs § 961 (1951).
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obligation on the part of one party only, as well as to bilateral con-
tracts.' The anticipatory repudiation of a bilateral contract relieves
the injured promisee of any further duty to perform. This is precisely
the position of the promisee of a repudiated contract where there
exists an executory obligation on the part of only one party. In
neither situation does the promisee have a further duty to perform.
Why an immediate cause of action should be awarded one promisee
and denied the other is not apparent. The harm caused to the plaintiff
is equally great in either case; and it seems strange to deny a remedy
of this kind merely on the ground that he has already performed as
his contract required.10
The majority of jurisdictions have refused to allow recovery for
breach by anticipatory repudiation where there exists an executory
obligation on the part of only one party, due to a misconception that
to do so would allow the acceleration of a money debt.1 This is clearly
erroneous. There is no acceleration. The promisee is allowed his
remedy of damages as a substitute for performance. An action for
breach of anticipatory repudiation is in assumpsit and not debt.
The Washington supreme court, in the present case, did not ex-
pressly deny that a contract executory as to the obligation of only
one party could be breached by that party's anticipatory repudiation.
The court took the position that there was not, on the facts before the
court, such a repudiation as to allow recovery on that ground. In
reaching this result, the court relied on the decisions of Mobley v.
New York Life Ins. Co.'" and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas.'3
These cases held that the mere refusal to pay monthly benefit install-
ments upon a mistake or misunderstanding of matters of fact or upon
the erroneous construction of a disability clause was sufficient to
constitute a breach of the disability clause, but that it did not amount
to a renunciation or repudiation of the policy. In the present case, the
refusal to pay was not due to any erroneous construction of a disability
clause, but was rather a direct denial of any liability because of the
9 Pollock v. Pollock, - Texas - , 46 S.W.2d 292 (1932). In this case, the
Texas court said: "... We are of the opinion that the rule of anticipatory breach
should still be applied, because every reason that can be given for applying the rule
to the one instance applies with equal force to the other. The doctrine which excepts
contracts fully performed by one side from the general rule is purely arbitrary and
without foundation in any logical reason." This decision is still good law in Texas.
See Humphrey v. Placid Oil Co., supra footnote 4.
10 4 CoRDiN, CoNnm.crs § 962 (1951).
11 Id. § 964.
12 295 U.S. 632 (1935).
13 297 U.S. 672 (1936).
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alleged release. In the Mobley case, the refusal to pay was caused by
the insurer's good-faith, but mistaken, belief that the total disability
asserted by the insured no longer existed. The validity and binding
character of the policy was not denied. The insurer denied his duty
to pay the installments because he honestly disputed the existence
of facts that were a condition precedent to his obligations. The insurer
admitted that, if the facts did exist, it was his duty to pay. However,
in the principal case, the insurer denied his liability under the policy
in spite of the occurrence of the condition precedent to his duty to pay.
He refused to pay because he believed he had been effectively relieved
of any liability under the policy by a release.
Although the Washington court professes to follow the Mobley and
Viglas cases, it is obvious that it has extended the rule of those cases
to cover a very different fact situation. In so doing, the court was able
to avoid deciding whether or not the doctrine of breach by anticipatory
repudiation was applicable to contracts where there exists an executory
obligation on the part of only one party. As a result, the following
question is posed for the Washington lawyer: Was it the intent of
the court merely to avoid applying the doctrine in this particular case,
or is it to be concluded that the doctrine has no applicability in this
type of case? The unnecessary confusion of the law continues.
Third Party Beneficiary Contracts. In American Pipe & Construc-
tion Company v. Harbor Construction Company,' a unique situation
arose, calling for a brief re-examination of the law of third party
beneficiaries.' The city of Anacortes obligated itself to deliver water
to the Shell Oil Company's new refinery. To accomplish this, the city
had to install pipe lines to the refinery. The city contracted with
the American Pipe & Construction Company, hereinafter referred to
as the supplier, to furnish the pipe for this project. Since time was
of the essence in the city's contract with Shell, the city exacted a
promise from the supplier that the pipe would be delivered to the
trench sides and that the deliveries would be completed by a certain
date.
Subsequent to the execution of this contract the city solicited bids
1 151 Wash. Dec. 229, 317 P.2d 521 (1957).
2 For an extensive and critical analysis of the existing law and theory of the law of
third party beneficiaries, see Third Party Beneficiary Concept: A Proposal, 57 COL.
L. Rxv. 406 (1957).
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for the installation job. The specifications for the bids included the
requirement that the installation job was to be completed in ninety-five
days, and also a recital of the supplier's promise as to dates of de-
livery of the pipe. The Harbor Construction Company, hereafter
referred to as the installer, was the successful bidder. The contract
between the city and the installer provided that: "In no case shall
the Owner (meaning the city) be liable for claims made by the Con-
tractor (meaning the installer) for failure of the Owner's manufacturer
to deliver as scheduled or promised."' (Parenthesis added.)
The supplier brought suit on a contract having no connection with
the contract which is the subject of this note. In that suit the installer
cross-complained for damages resulting from the failure of the sup-
plier to make deliveries as promised in its contract with the city.
The installer claimed that he was a third party beneficiary of the
supplier's contract with the city.
The right of a beneficially interested third person to enforce a
contract as a third party beneficiary was established in the landmark
case of Lawrence v. Fox.4 These third persons who are recognized as
having enforceable rights created in them by a contract to which
they are not parties and for which they have given no consideration,
have been loosely grouped into three classes: (1) creditor bene-
ficiaries, (2) donee beneficiaries, and (3) incidental beneficiaries. The
third person is a creditor beneficiary if the promisee expresses an
intention that this third person shall receive the performance of the
promisor in satisfaction and discharge of some actual or supposed duty
or liability of the promisee. If, on the other hand, the promisee ex-
presses an intention that this third person shall receive either the
benefit of the promisor's performance or the security of the promise
itself as a gift, the third person is a donee beneficiary.' An incidental
beneficiary, as Prof. Corbin aptly defines him, is one who is neither a
3 151 Wash. Dec. at 231, 317 P.2d at 523.
4 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
r4 CoRDiN, CONTRACTS §§ 774-785 (1951); WLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 386 (1936);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 133 (1932). See also for further reference on the existing
law of third party beneficiaries; Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291 of International Long-
shoremen's Assn., 204 F.2d 495 (3rd Cir. 1953) ; U.S. v. Inorganic, Inc., 109 F. Supp.
576 (E.D. Tenn. 1952); Johnson Farm Equipment Co. v. Cook, 230 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.
1956), Leahy v. Smith, 137 Cal.2d 884, 290 P.2d 679 (1955) ; Watson v. Aced,
Cal.2d - , 319 P.2d 83 (1957) ; Permian Basin Inv. Corp. v. Lloyd, - N.M. -,
312 P.2d 533 (1957) ; Vikingstad v. Baggot, 46 Wn.2d 494, 282 P.2d 824 (1955). For
articles discussing and analyzing the law of third party beneficiaries, see 17 BROOxLYN
L. REv. 29 (1950), 27 AusT. L. J. 175 (1953), 44 Ky. L. J. 470 (1950), 17 lo. L. REV.
214 (1952), 12 U. PiTr. L. REv. 295 (1951), 1 SYRAcusE L. REV. 334 (1949).
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creditor nor a donee, and who has no enforceable interest in the
contract involved.6
The Washington supreme court held, affirming the judgment of the
trial court, that the installer had no enforceable interest in the supplier's
contract with the city. The court reasoned that, as the city had dis-
claimed any duty or liability as to the time of delivery to the installer,
there was no duty or liability which could be discharged by the per-
formance of the supplier. Therefore, the installer could not be a
creditor beneficiary of the supplier's promise. The court, finding no
intent by the promisee city that the supplier was to assume any direct
obligation or performance to the installer, held that the installer
could not enforce the provisions of the supplier's contract with the
city as a donee beneficiary.
It is readily apparent that the installer does not fall within either
the donee or creditor beneficiary classifications as they exist today.
However, it does appear that it was intended by the promisee city
that the installer was to be more than incidentally benefited by the
supplier's promise. The city owed a duty to Shell to have the water
delivered by a certain date. To assure the meeting of this time require-
ment, the city exacted a promise from the supplier that deliveries
would be made by certain dates. It seems quite obvious that the city
intended the performance and the immediate benefit of this promise
to go to the installer, as the delivery dates promised by the supplier
were included in the specifications for the installation job. The in-
staller undoubtedly relied on this promise when he made his bids,
and if the city had not intended him to utilize these dates in making
his bid, it would not have placed them in the specifications. Never-
theless, when the installer sought to recover damages because the
promise was not performed, he was denied because his status was not
that of a donee or creditor beneficiary.
The right of a third party beneficiary to enforce a promise rests
chiefly upon the fact that the promise obtained from the promisor
by the promisee creates, and is intended by the promisee to create,
reasonable expectations on the beneficiary's part which induces him
to change his position in reliance on the promised performance.7 In
the present case the installer relied on the promise in submitting his
bid, and it seems quite apparent that the promisee city intended him
64 ComIN, CONmACTS § 779 C (1951).
7 Ibid. at § 775.
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to do so. Admittedly, the installer fits neither the donee nor the
creditor nomenclature; however, the reasons for allowing third party
beneficiaries to recover are present. If the facts of a given case present
the very reasons for allowing recovery, the mere inapplicability of
existing legal terminology ought not to defeat an interest which is in
substance no different from those which are presently protected under
the terms donee or creditor beneficiaries. Although other jurisdictions
have allowed recovery, despite the fact that the third party was not
strictly speaking a donee or creditor benefiiciaryl the present case
seems to indicate a lack of willingness on the part of the Washington
court to extend the current doctrines of third party beneficiaries to
such an extent. If a defect in existing legal terminology is all that is
preventing recovery in the present case, a new term, such as com-
mercial beneficiary, could be created to remedy this present defect.
ALLAN D. LoucKs
CORPORATIONS
Right to Repurchase Shares. In Jackson v. Colograssi' the Wash-
ington court construed a 1947 amendment to RCW 23.08.080 for the
first time. The amendment reads as follows:
(2) Every corporation organized hereunder shall have the power to
purchase, hold, sell, and transfer shares of its own capital stock:
Provided, that no such corporation shall use its funds or property for
the purchase of its own shares of capital stock when such use would
cause any impairment of the capital stock of the corporation.
The plaintiff was a trustee in bankruptcy who was suing to recover
$18,000 paid for the purchase of shares by the now bankrupt corpora-
tion. The defendants had purchased $18,000 worth of stock and also
obtained a repurchase agreement from the corporation. Subsequently,
the defendants requested that the corporation repurchase the shares.
Since the corporation did not have sufficient cash to repurchase the
shares, the defendants were willing to accept a cancellation of a por-
8 There have been numerous cases allowing recovery to a third party beneficiary
although there was a complete absence of a donative spirit and also of any actual, sup-
posed, or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary at the time the contract was
made. See Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Coxhead v.
Winsted Hardware Mfg. Co., 4 F.R.D. 448 (D. Conn. 1945); Johnston v. Franklin
Kirk Co., 183 Ind. App. 519, 148 N.E. 177 (1925) ; cf. Burt v. Brownstone Realty Co.,
95 N.J.L. 457, 112 Atl. 883 (1921).
150 Wn.2d 572, 313 P.2d 697 (1957).
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